CD dotenv
Use dotenv to manage environment variables for Node.js projects.
As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:188Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)curl -fsS https://dotenvx.sh/ | sh
Medium and low: 2
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keySKILL.md:149Private key material (key header without key body; quoted — discussed, not commanded)PRIVATE_KEY="-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
header onlyquoted -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keySKILL.md:155Private key material (key header without key body; quoted — discussed, not commanded)PRIVATE_KEY="-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …"
header onlyquoted
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, git) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 4 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1710 tokens
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 64: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 30 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
- +4Has examples (26 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.