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AB ai-compliance

AI compliance analysis for EU AI Act, ISO 42001, NIST AI RMF, GDPR, OECD, financial services regulations (SEC, FCA, FINRA, DORA, MiFID II), and other frameworks. Use when asked to generate a compliance checklist for an AI tool or use case, determine if a risk assessment is required, score an AI tool's risk level, identify where an AI tool or use case could run afoul of regulatory requirements, perform a gap analysis, recommend remediation steps, assess a vendor, draft an acceptable use policy, map training requirements, or review jurisdiction-specific AI rules. Triggers on phrases like "compliance checklist", "risk assessment", "risk score", "does this comply", "EU AI Act", "ISO 42001", "NIST AI RMF", "AI governance", "gap analysis", "vendor assessment", "acceptable use policy", "MNPI", "AI training requirements", or any request to evaluate an AI tool or use case for regulatory compliance or risk.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: OpieTaylor911 v1.1.0 MIT-0 18 files body ≈ 927 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, failures and branches, running it twice

AnalyzerSecurityLegaltype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
93
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/remediation-playbooks.md:129
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo chmod 600 /etc/openclaw/secrets.env
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/remediation-playbooks.md:130
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo chown bcaddy:bcaddy /etc/openclaw/secrets.env
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/vendor-assessment.md:39
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - [ ] Vulnerability disclosure / bug bounty program in place?
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/vendor-assessment.md:40
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - [ ] Penetration testing conducted? Frequency?

    Files scanned: 18. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 27 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 927 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 910: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 12 example trigger phrases
    • +4Structure: 10 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (16 of 16)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This documentation-only compliance skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but it bundles company-specific security and compliance telemetry that should not be reused as generic guidance.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026