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CC skill-stripe-monitor

Stripe revenue dashboard in your agent — MRR, churn, new subscriptions, failed payments, and alerts. Use when the operator asks about revenue, subscriptions, churn, failed payments, or Stripe activity.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Ordo-tech v1.0.2 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 2 255 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureStripeData and analyticsAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
66
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 10

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 10
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL-FULL.md:112
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -u "$STRIPE_KEY:" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL-FULL.md:163
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -u "$STRIPE_KEY:" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL-FULL.md:174
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -u "$STRIPE_KEY:" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:111
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -u "$STRIPE_KEY:" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:162
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -u "$STRIPE_KEY:" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:173
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -u "$STRIPE_KEY:" \
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL-FULL.md:103
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s -u "$STRIPE_KEY:" "https://api.stripe.com/v1/..."
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL-FULL.md:137
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      RESP=$(curl -s -u "$STRIPE_KEY:" "https://api.stripe.com/v1/subscriptions?${PARAMS}")
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:102
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s -u "$STRIPE_KEY:" "https://api.stripe.com/v1/..."
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:136
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      RESP=$(curl -s -u "$STRIPE_KEY:" "https://api.stripe.com/v1/subscriptions?${PARAMS}")
      vendor-host

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 22 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2255 tokens
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 201: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 20 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
    • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a plausible Stripe monitoring skill, but it asks users to allow more Stripe authority and external sharing than a read-only dashboard clearly needs.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026