SKILLEMALL.ai

AC shieldswarm-redteam-resilience

Defensive multi-agent SRE/SecOps red-team and purple-team resilience commander with working mode selection, command validation, approval gates, and a machine-readable model quality-floor matrix. Use when planning authorized incident response, defensive red-team/purple-team exercises, model-resilience fallbacks, rollback planning, or evidence handling. Defensive-only, authorization-gated, non-offensive; no attack traffic, no login bypass, no credential collection.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: orionshaowswmw v2.1.4 MIT-0 49 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 2 373 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

Defensive multi-agent SRE/SecOps red-team and purple-team resilience commander with working mode selection, command validation, approval gates, and a…

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
96/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
90
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 0

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Files scanned: 49. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "categories"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "topics"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 22 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2373 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 467: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 12 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)
    • +3All 4 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is openly defensive, but important safety gates can incorrectly approve unsafe commands or approval checks, so it needs review before operational use.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 7 Sept 2026