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AC wip-xai-x

X Platform API. Read posts, search tweets, get bookmarks, post tweets, upload media.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Parker Todd Brooks v1.0.4 MIT-0 14 files body ≈ 936 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:91
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…GLi+2W/6ao+6Y7gu/RCwR…Kng==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:270
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…GLw+xYSd…cqA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:325
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…FrF+LTRo…W3g==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:334
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…A6j+hAmM…GbS+kf5c…csw==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:343
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…5bm+c2gQ…aG5+esrLODihIorn+Pe6F…dXA==",
      detector

    Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "openclaw"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 26 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 936 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Description length 84: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +4Structure: 19 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This X integration is mostly coherent, but it can post and delete live tweets without built-in confirmation and its top-level metadata under-discloses deletion.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026