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AD console-agent

Build AI agents with console.agent() - the jQuery of AI Agents. Drop console.agent(...) anywhere in your code for agentic workflows with the simplicity of console.log(). Use when adding AI agent capabilities, debugging with AI, security auditing, intelligent logging, or runtime analysis.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Pash10g v0.1.0 2 files body ≈ 3 977 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorGitHubAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security AGENTS.md:164
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      OWASP security expert and penetration testing specialist. Audits code/inputs for SQL injection, XSS, CSRF, SSRF, and more.
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal AGENTS.md:557
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
      apiKey: "sk-a…xyz",

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (console-agent) differs from the folder (skills-3)
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 34 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3977 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -214 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 288: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 61 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
    • +4Has examples (40 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is a coherent AI-agent integration guide, but it needs Review because its default source-code sharing and broad runtime-data examples can expose sensitive project data to external AI services.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026