BC paytrigo-openclawbot
Use when an OpenClawBot needs to create or verify PayTrigo payments on Base/USDC without webhooks.
As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenscripts/moltbot-bot-flow.mjs:9Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)const API_KEY = 'sk_l…T28';
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenscripts/moltbot-human-flow.mjs:8Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)const API_KEY = 'sk_l…T28';
-
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalscripts/moltbot-bot-flow.mjs:9Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)const API_KEY = 'sk_l…T28';
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low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalscripts/moltbot-human-flow.mjs:8Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)const API_KEY = 'sk_l…T28';
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
- 85Steps. 25 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1134 tokens
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 98: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 21 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
- +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.