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CB liquidity-planner

Plan liquidity provision on PancakeSwap. Use when user says "add liquidity on pancakeswap", "provide liquidity", "LP on pancakeswap", or describes wanting to deposit tokens into liquidity pools without writing code. Also use when a user holds two tokens and asks how to earn yield, get best profit, or put tokens to work — especially on Solana or any chain where farming is unavailable.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: pcs-bot v1.1.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 8 954 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, consistency, execution cost

ProcedureInfrastructureSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
72/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
64
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Obfuscation medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.

For the author

Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 12
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(curl:*)
    allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Glob Grep Bash(curl:*) Bash(jq:*) Bash(cast:*) Bash(node:*) Bash(python3:*) Bash(xdg-open:*) Bash(open:*) WebFetch WebSearch Task(subagent_type:Explore) AskUserQuestion
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:156
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -G "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/search" --data-urlencode "q=$KEYWORD" | \
  • medium Obfuscation obf-base64-blob SKILL.md:615
    Long base64-looking blob
    https://pancakeswap.finance/stable/add/0x55…955/0x8A…80d?chain=bsc
  • medium Obfuscation obf-base64-blob SKILL.md:621
    Long base64-looking blob
    https://pancakeswap.finance/add/0x55…955/0xe9…D56/100?chain=bsc
  • medium Obfuscation obf-base64-blob SKILL.md:627
    Long base64-looking blob
    https://pancakeswap.finance/add/11111111111111111111111111111111/EPjF…t1v/2500?chain=sol
  • medium Obfuscation obf-base64-blob SKILL.md:633
    Long base64-looking blob
    https://pancakeswap.finance/add/Es9v…NYB/EPjF…t1v/100?chain=sol
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:202
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    > (`0xbb…95c` on BSC,
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:211
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
    | USDT  | `Es9v…NYB` | 6        |
    table
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:212
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
    | USDC  | `EPjF…t1v` | 6        |
    table
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:230
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    TOKEN="0x0E…E82"  # CAKE
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:244
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    TOKEN="0x0E…E82"
    detector
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob SKILL.md:730
    Long base64-looking blob (code comment)
    // https://pancakeswap.finance/add/11111111111111111111111111111111/EPjF…t1v/2500?chain=sol
    comment

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 8954 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (liquidity-planner) differs from the folder (pcs-liquidity-planner)
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8954 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 111 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 8 branches, has a failure section
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 386: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 47 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 111 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (28 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill mostly does PancakeSwap liquidity planning, but it also has under-disclosed telemetry, broad permissions, and transaction-adjacent links that users should review carefully.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026