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小红书自动化 — 用 exec 工具运行脚本来登录、发布、爬热点、AI 生成图文。所有操作必须通过 exec 工具执行 uv run 命令，不要用 browser 工具。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Pearl v1.0.1 60 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 462 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
87
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/xhs_generate_content.py:239
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/xhs_login_persistent.py:5
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (detector / deny-list definition)
    After login, cookies are saved both in Chrome profile AND in the JSON file.
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host install.sh:41
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (string literal in code, not executed)
    fail "uv not found. Install it first:\n  brew install uv  (macOS)\n  curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh  (Linux)"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host xhs-toolkit/install_deps.py:53
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (string literal in code, not executed)
    print("  curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh")
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege xhs-toolkit/README.md:96
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    2. `sudo chown -R 1200:1200 ./chrome-data` 赋予seluser的读写权限，1200是seluser的uid
    quoted

Files scanned: 60. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (xhs) differs from the folder (openclaw-xhs)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (git) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 4 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 462 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 85: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -32 of 8 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 4 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill mostly matches its Xiaohongshu automation purpose, but it bundles sensitive session handling and network-exposed automation features that need review before installation.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026