SKILLEMALL.ai

BC agent-gateway

Agent Gateway — 16 tools for TON blockchain. Wallet info, transfers, jettons, NFTs, .ton DNS, prices, DEX orders, and autonomous agent wallets. Package: @tongateway/mcp

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Volodya Plotvinov v0.9.3 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 1 098 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
62
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SECURITY.md:14
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    The token stored in `~/.tongateway/token` is a **session token (JWT)**, not a private key or seed phrase. It allows the agent to:
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SECURITY.md:21
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - Access your private key or seed phrase

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: Agent Gateway — 16 tools for TON blockchain. Wallet info, transfer… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (agent-gateway) differs from the folder (tongateway)
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 13 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1098 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 168: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 62.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is transparent about being TON wallet tooling, but it needs Review because it can give an AI agent persistent wallet access and no-approval spending from funded agent wallets.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026