SKILLEMALL.ai

BB p2claw

Publishes apps you've built locally as peer-to-peer URLs that anyone with the link can open in a browser. Use when the user wants to share a working app — built or running on this machine — with someone else (or use it on their phone) without deploying to a cloud, signing up for a service, or opening a port through their router.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Sebastián Estévez v0.1.1 MIT-0 3 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 547 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/install.sh:73
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      3. Re-run inside WSL:         ${BLD}curl -fsSL https://p2claw.com/install | sh${RST}
      vendor-host
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/install.sh:177
      Writes to a shell startup file
      ${BLD}echo 'export PATH="$INSTALL_DIR:\$PATH"' >> ~/.zshrc${RST}     # zsh
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/install.sh:178
      Writes to a shell startup file
      ${BLD}echo 'export PATH="$INSTALL_DIR:\$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc${RST}    # bash
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:195
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      > `~/Library/LaunchAgents/dev.…ist`, no sudo required.
      quoted
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/install.sh:5
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment; the skill's own vendor host)
      #   curl -fsSL https://p2claw.com/install | sh
      commentvendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/install.sh:6
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment; the skill's own vendor host)
      #   curl -fsSL https://p2claw.com/install | sh -s -- --version v0.1.0
      commentvendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/install.sh:7
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment; the skill's own vendor host)
      #   curl -fsSL https://p2claw.com/install | sh -s -- --prefix /usr/local/bin
      commentvendor-host

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Failures and branches. 8 branches
    • 100Steps. 36 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3547 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (8 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 330: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 18 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items
    • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This skill is a disclosed localhost-sharing tool, with real public-exposure risk but clear user confirmation and safety guidance.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026