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BC 31third-safe-rebalancer

Policy-aware Safe portfolio rebalancing assistant for 31Third ExecutorModule.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Phips0812 v0.2.0 MIT-0 49 files body ≈ 1 231 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 12
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets dist/index.js:423
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    'Never share the Safe owner private key. Only the executor wallet private key should be provided to this skill for execution.',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token dist/src/contracts.js:15
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export const HARDCODED_BATCH_TRADE_ADDRESS = '0xD2…f6e';
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token dist/src/contracts.js:16
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export const HARDCODED_TOKEN_FEED_REGISTRY_ADDRESS = '0x1d…46A';
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token dist/tests/rebalance.test.js:7
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const PRICE_ORACLE = '0x1d…46A';
    fixturequoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets index.ts:601
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    'Never share the Safe owner private key. Only the executor wallet private key should be provided to this skill for execution.',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:157
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…QYA+ISs0/2l3T9/kj42…aQT/dfNXWX/ZZCQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:361
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-6+gjmF…uh8+uw3mnrvgs+dSPQ…dZG+D4garKg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:378
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…DUr+vOv8…A8A==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:436
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…p81+8Ob3…L40/b0i7…gQw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:460
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…jgR+Mkmf+D189…ihQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/contracts.ts:18
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export const HARDCODED_BATCH_TRADE_ADDRESS = '0xD2…f6e' as Address;
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/contracts.ts:19
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export const HARDCODED_TOKEN_FEED_REGISTRY_ADDRESS = '0x1d…46A' as Address;
    quoted

Files scanned: 42. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 33 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1231 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 77: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 33 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a legitimate 31Third Safe rebalancing skill, but it can automatically submit real portfolio trades and send portfolio planning data to 31Third, so it should be reviewed carefully before installation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026