SKILLEMALL.ai

BD Rate Limit Audit

Missing rate limit detector for API codebases. Scans Express/Koa/Fastify/NestJS, FastAPI/Flask/Django, Go (gin/chi/echo), Spring Boot, and Ruby (Rack) for 10 classes of unprotected endpoints — auth routes open to brute force, payment endpoints with no throttle, email/SMS senders without limit (cost amplification), search routes with no query throttle, retry logic without backoff, admin endpoints without per-IP limiting, and more. Zero external dependencies. Works on directories or single files. CI fail-gate included.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Lucius Pang v1.0.3 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 7 772 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
57
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:60
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    | RL006 | HIGH | Admin endpoint without per-IP rate limiting | Privilege escalation via brute force |
    detector

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7772 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Rate Limit Audit) differs from the folder (phy-rate-limit-audit)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7772 tokens
  • 100Steps. 18 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 522: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 57.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
The skill is a local static-analysis helper for finding missing API rate limits and does not show hidden network, credential, persistence, or destructive behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026