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CC pinata-erc-8004

Register and verify ERC-8004 AI agents on-chain using Pinata IPFS and Viem for blockchain transactions

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Pinata v1.0.7 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 7 340 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice

AnalyzerAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
70/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
59
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 7
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:24
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Risk: The skill requires sensitive credentials, including a wallet private key and Pinata token. <br>
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:21
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    1. **PRIVATE_KEY (Ethereum wallet private key)**
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:352
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - `PRIVATE_KEY` - Ethereum wallet private key (with 0x prefix) for signing transactions - **USE A DEDICATED WALLET WITH MINIMAL FUNDS**
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:817
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - Use hex string, not mnemonic phrase
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:456
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Contract Address: MUST be one of the two official registry addresses listed in "OFFICIAL ERC-8004 IDENTITY REGISTRY ADDRESSES" section. Mainnet: `0x80…432`. Testnet
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:754
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Address:** `0x80…432`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:758
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Address:** `0x80…D9e`
    quoted

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7340 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, write, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7340 tokens
  • 85Steps. 312 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 22 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 102: 120–800 characters recommended
  • -216 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 75 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 312 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 59.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a high-risk but clearly disclosed blockchain/IPFS registration skill with scoped credentials, confirmations, and guardrails.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 27 May 2026