SKILLEMALL.ai

BC clawchest

Your secure banking system for file and data storage. Deposit money, files, JSON data, and secrets.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: pkyanam v1.0.0 2 files body ≈ 2 812 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, consistency

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url SKILL.md:141
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint ("only send to …" — scoping, not exfiltration; documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
    🔒 **Remember:** Only send your API key to `https://clawchest.com` — never anywhere else!
    scopedsecurity skillvendor-host

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (clawchest) differs from the folder (clawchest-setup)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 30 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2812 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 99: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 47 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (35 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill openly provides a storage and banking API, but it also encourages recurring uploads of local activity data and high-impact operations without enough user control or safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026