BB warren-deploy
Deploy websites and files permanently on MegaETH blockchain. AI agents stress test the network by deploying HTML on-chain using SSTORE2 bytecode storage. Agents pay their own gas.
As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, running it twice, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
-
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:79Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target--private-key <key> Wallet private key (or PRIVATE_KEY env)
-
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokendeploy.js:23High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)const GENESIS_KEY_ADDRESS = process.env.GENESIS_KEY_ADDRESS || '0x95…692';
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokendeploy.js:24High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)const MASTER_NFT_ADDRESS = process.env.MASTER_NFT_ADDRESS || '0x7b…5F9';
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsdeploy.js:287Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)--private-key <key> Wallet private key (or set PRIVATE_KEY env)
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:146High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)| Genesis Key NFT | `0x95…692` |
table -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:147High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)| MasterNFT Registry | `0x7b…5F9` |
table
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 15 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 5 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 980 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 179: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 21 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.