BB warren-nft
Deploy NFT collections permanently on MegaETH blockchain. Images stored on-chain via SSTORE2. Create and launch NFT collections with royalties, minting, and management pages.
As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 7
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 7
-
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokendeploy-nft.js:24High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)const GENESIS_KEY_ADDRESS = process.env.GENESIS_KEY_ADDRESS || '0x95…692';
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokendeploy-nft.js:25High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)const CONTAINER_ADDRESS = process.env.CONTAINER_ADDRESS || '0xab…a0B';
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokendeploy-nft.js:26High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)const RENDERER_ADDRESS = process.env.RENDERER_ADDRESS || '0x99…E6D';
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsdeploy-nft.js:492Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)--private-key <key> Wallet private key (or set PRIVATE_KEY env)
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:173High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)| Genesis Key NFT | `0x95…692` |
table -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:174High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)| WarrenContainer | `0xab…a0B` |
table -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:175High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)| ContainerRenderer | `0x99…E6D` |
table
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 11 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1365 tokens
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (9 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 174: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 17 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
This NFT deployment skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but it needs review because it uses wallet signing authority to deploy opaque contract bytecode with an undisclosed default treasury and limited user confirmation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026