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BC aegis

Automated Emergency Geopolitical Intelligence System — real-time threat monitoring and safety alerts for civilians in conflict zones. Use when: (1) setting up warzone/crisis safety monitoring for a location, (2) user asks about security situation or threat level, (3) configuring emergency alert delivery, (4) generating security briefings, (5) emergency preparedness planning.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: PleaseChooseUsername v3.4.0 MIT-0 23 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 544 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 5 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

GeneratorTelegramInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
79
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/aegis_channel.py:101
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/sendMessage"
      quoted
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/aegis_channel.py:117
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      pin_url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/pinChatMessage"
      quoted
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/aegis_feed.py:310
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/sendMessage"
      quoted
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/aegis_feed.py:324
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      pin_url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/pinChatMessage"
      quoted
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:130
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      4. Telegram Bot API (`https://api.telegram.org/bot.../sendMessage`) — only if channel delivery is configured
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 23. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 51 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2544 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • -33 of 8 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 377: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 23 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 51 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    AEGIS appears purpose-built for crisis monitoring, but it needs Review because it can store secrets, post automated Telegram alerts, and optionally send sensitive crisis/location context to third-party LLM endpoints with incomplete disclosure.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026