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BD powerloom-bds-univ3

Autonomous Uniswap V3 monitoring on consensus-backed data with onchain provenance. Every data point is finalized on-chain by Powerloom's DSV network and independently verifiable. Ships with Whale Radar, Token-Flow, and DeFi Analyst recipes. Free API key at bds-metering.powerloom.io/metering (2 credits, no wallet). Triggers on "whale alert", "track trades", "all trades for", "by token", "Powerloom", "verify on-chain", "verified data".

ClawHub Agent Skills author: powerloom-bot v0.2.6 MIT-0 33 files body ≈ 2 677 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
76/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
78
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 18

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 18
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/08-openclaw-one-shot.md:15
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    a. **Payer wallet private key** — paste your EVM private key for the funded wallet that will pay 50 $POWER for the credit plan. **Use a burner wallet only** — never a wallet holding significant assets
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:39
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…jgR+Mkmf+D189…ihQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token recipes/defi-analyst.yaml:11
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    volume_token_address: "0xA0…B48"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token recipes/defi-analyst.yaml:13
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    pool_address: "0x88…640"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token recipes/token-flow.yaml:7
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    token_address: "0xA0…B48"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token recipes/whale-radar.yaml:16
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - "0x88…640"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token recipes/whale-radar.yaml:17
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - "0x8a…6D8"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/05-data-market-scope.md:7
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
    | WETH/USDC | `0x88…640` | 0.05% |
    table
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/defi-analyst.mjs:14
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const USDC_MAINNET = "0xA0…B48";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/defi-analyst.mjs:27
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    pool_address: "0x88…640",
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/lib/dispatch.mjs:22
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    const u = `https://api.telegram.org/bot${token}/sendMessage`;
    placeholder
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/token-flow.mjs:24
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const USDC_MAINNET = "0xA0…B48";
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/whale-cron.mjs:91
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    const r = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${TG_TOKEN}/sendMessage`, {
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/whale-cron.mjs:91
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const r = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${TG_TOKEN}/sendMessage`, {
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/whale-cron.mjs:100
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    const r2 = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${TG_TOKEN}/sendMessage`, {
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/whale-cron.mjs:100
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const r2 = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${TG_TOKEN}/sendMessage`, {
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/whale-radar.mjs:30
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "0x88…640",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/whale-radar.mjs:31
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "0x8a…6D8",
    quoted

Files scanned: 33. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "repository"

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 64Steps. 3 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2677 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • -31 of 9 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 7 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 437: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 3 items
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 9)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is not artifact-backed malicious, but it needs review because its optional setup can make an agent handle wallet private keys, long-lived credentials, and irreversible on-chain payments.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026