SKILLEMALL.ai

AD pastewatch-mcp

Secret redaction MCP server for OpenClaw agents. Prevents API keys, DB credentials, SSH keys, emails, IPs, JWTs, and 30+ other secret types from leaking to LLM providers. Includes guard command, API proxy, canary tokens, encrypted vault, git history scanning, org posture scanning, file watcher, and dashboard. Use when reading/writing files that may contain secrets, setting up agent security, or auditing for credential exposure.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: ppiankov v1.3.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 1 867 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:114
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      systemctl enable pastewatch-proxy
      security skill

    A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Steps. 2 steps
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, write) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1867 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3No numbered steps or checklist
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 431: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 18 headings
    • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This skill is a clearly disclosed local secret-redaction integration, though it can inspect sensitive files and optionally run a persistent LLM API proxy if the user enables it.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026