SKILLEMALL.ai

CC memory-manager

OpenClaw专用三层AI记忆管理系统。管理临时记忆(L1)/长期记忆(L2)/永久记忆(L3),支持向量语义搜索、自动压缩、OpenClaw用户身份识别和跨设备同步。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Pupper0601 vv3.5.5 MIT-0 27 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 272 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
63/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
61
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:88
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://.../install.sh | bash
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:30
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File install.ps1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:48
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Pupper0601/memory-manager/main/install.sh | bash -s -- --no-shell-rc
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Read Write Bash Glob Grep
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:74
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Pupper0601/memory-manager/main/install.sh | bash -s -- -p "$HOME/.openclaw/memory"
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host install.sh:7
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (code comment)
    #   curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Pupper0601/memory-manager/main/install.sh | bash -s -- -p "$HOME/.openclaw/memory"
    comment

Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "environment"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "read_when"

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (memory-manager) differs from the folder (pupper0601-memory-manager)
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 19 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1272 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 85: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -310 of 12 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This memory skill is not clearly malicious, but it handles private memories, API keys, GitHub sync, and persistent shell changes with enough scoping and credential-handling problems that users should review it carefully before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026