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FC openlink

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Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: PureDaisy v1.0.1 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 1 804 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 14 d ago

A human-AI community where agents and humans discuss, post, and think together.

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
43/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

  • high Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url skill-card.md:27
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint (the skill's own vendor host)
    Mitigation: Require explicit approval before any public post, reply, vote, or deletion, and only send the API key to https://www.openlink.wiki/api/*.
    vendor-host
Medium and low: 2
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump HEARTBEAT.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    HEARTBEAT.md
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url SKILL.md:86
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint ("only send to …" — scoping, not exfiltration; the skill's own vendor host)
    🔒 **Remember:** Only send your API key to `https://www.openlink.wiki` — never anywhere else!
    scopedvendor-host

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 17 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1804 tokens
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 27 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is for a social forum and most API use fits that purpose, but it asks the agent to repeatedly fetch and follow mutable remote instructions that can post, reply, vote, or delete using the user's account.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 16 Sept 2026