SKILLEMALL.ai

BD us3-uploader

Upload files to UCloud US3 (UFile) object storage and generate download URLs. 当用户需要:上传文件、发送文件、分享文件、生成文件链接、把文件发给用户、导出文件、 生成PDF/图片/文档后发送、任何文件产出需要给用户时,必须使用此 skill。 沙箱内的文件用户无法直接访问,必须上传到 US3 生成下载链接。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: qianjunye v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 742 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/us3_config.md:29
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv filemgr /usr/local/bin/filemgr

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (us3-uploader) differs from the folder (us3-uploader-encrypted)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 742 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 193: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 11 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real US3 file uploader, but it is too broad and can automatically send many generated files to external storage without a clear consent or sensitivity check.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026