SKILLEMALL.ai

AB chat-deepseek

openclaw browser open https://chat.deepseek.com and login it, then input questions from user's messages, extract response of deepseek chat to reply user.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: christo v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 3 518 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 75/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: running it twice, progress reporting

ProcedureWhatsAppAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
90
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
75/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(curl:*)
      allowed-tools: Bash(npm:*) Bash(npx:*) Bash(openclaw:*) Bash(curl:*) Read Write WebFetch

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "alias"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 75/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 24 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3518 tokens
    • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 153: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 17 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is a transparent DeepSeek browser automation helper, but it asks for broad command access and tells the agent to forward login QR-code screenshots through messaging apps.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026