SKILLEMALL.ai

BC archive-extractor

Recursively extract archive files from a file or directory. Supports zip, tar, tar.gz, tar.bz2, tar.xz, tgz, rar, 7z, gz, bz2, xz. Works on Windows, Linux, macOS — requires only Python 3.8+, no local software. Use when the user wants to "unzip", "unpack", "extract", or "decompress" archives, especially for bulk extraction, nested archives, or when idempotent re-runs are needed.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: leon388 v1.1.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 535 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ReferenceSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Concealment
If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Concealment en-hide-from-user skill-card.md:20
    Instruction to hide actions from the user
    Risk: The skill can silently run pip to install Python packages for optional archive formats. <br>

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 4 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 535 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 380: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This archive-extraction skill is mostly coherent, but it can silently run pip to install Python packages despite claiming no network or system-executable use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026