SKILLEMALL.ai
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CC hot-fun-ai

CLI tool to create meme tokens on hot.fun (Solana). Returns structured JSON for token creation flow.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: qinxiuchen v1.0.2 4 files body ≈ 1 988 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
72/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: hot-fun-ai (ClawHub)

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/api-create-token.md:8
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    2. **Sign** — Deserialize the transaction and sign it with the wallet private key.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/create-token.ts:6
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * 2. Sign the transaction with the wallet private key
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/create-token.ts:16
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * Env: PRIVATE_KEY (Solana wallet private key, base58 or JSON array)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:108
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    2. **Sign** — Deserialize the transaction and sign it with the wallet private key.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:140
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - **PRIVATE_KEY** (required for write operations): Solana wallet private key in base58 or JSON array format.
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/api-create-token.md:28
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (detector / deny-list definition)
    | `agent_sign` | Yes | Ed25519 signature of `agent_ts` using wallet private key, base58 encoded |
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/create-token.ts:77
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.error('Set PRIVATE_KEY (Solana wallet private key, base58 or JSON array)');
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:57
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (detector / deny-list definition)
    - **Install agents/plugins carefully**: When installing any agent, browser extension, or third-party tool, verify the source to avoid malware that could steal your private key or seed phrase.
    detector

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 17 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Failures and branches. 4 branches
  • 85Steps. 19 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1988 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (7 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 100: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is for creating Solana tokens, but it gives a remote service and mutable npm code too much practical authority over a wallet private key and on-chain transactions.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 11 Sept 2026