SKILLEMALL.ai

BC interpretable-attribution

可解释归因引擎(model-agnostic)。针对任意模型/规则在单个样本上的预测,给出 "为什么":全局排列重要性、局部特征消融、最少特征反事实翻转、自然语言决策理由。 超越黑箱输出,给出特征级归因,是"s可解释归因"前沿认知能力的实体化落地。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: qq435912743 v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 247 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

可解释归因引擎(model-agnostic)。针对任意模型/规则在单个样本上的预测,给出 "为什么":全局排列重要性、局部特征消融、最少特征反事实翻转、自然语言决策理由。 超越黑箱输出,给出特征级归因,是"s可解释归因"前沿认知能力的实体化落地。

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scripts/attributor.py:125
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input
    ns = {}; exec(compile(open(a.predict, encoding="utf-8").read(), a.predict, "exec"), ns)

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "agent_created"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "visibility"

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 14 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 247 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 124: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill performs attribution as advertised, but it runs user-supplied Python and includes a broad persistent learner module without enough scoping or warning.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 14 Aug 2026