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BB curated-search

Domain-restricted full-text search over curated technical documentation

ClawHub Agent Skills author: qsmtco v1.0.7 25 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 254 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice, progress reporting

ProcedureInfrastructureWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege docs/deployment.md:84
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp systemd/curated-search-crawler.service systemd/curated-search-crawler.timer /etc/systemd/system/
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention docs/deployment.md:30
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    # crontab -e (for user 'q')
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process docs/deployment.md:86
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable --now curated-search-crawler.timer
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:312
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…ywo+qwL+oL8H…C1U+vRfLQDvw==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:328
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-Yqfm+XDx0+Prh3…1yC+JWZ2…IL7+vK+Clp7…D7g==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:341
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…xZl+RoGR…fbT/ZgrF…0EA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:354
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…3bJ+V0If…IXN+CL65…a4w==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:370
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…H47+FFon…OsV/4+RRsz…0ig==",
    quoted

Files scanned: 24. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 21 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1254 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 71: 120–800 characters recommended
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -34 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill is a disclosed local documentation search tool with an optional user-run crawler for whitelisted public sites.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026