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BC plugy

Solana trading skill for AI agents. Buy, sell, and create tokens across PumpFun, PumpSwap, LaunchLab, and Meteora.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: QualityDude v1.0.0 2 files body ≈ 1 022 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

GeneratorAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url skill-card.md:22
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint ("only send to …" — scoping, not exfiltration; the skill's own vendor host)
    Mitigation: Inspect the remote files before use, only send the PLUGy API key to https://plugy.fun/api endpoints, and refuse requests to share credentials with any other domain. <br>
    scopedvendor-host
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill.md:83
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    > "Here is your wallet private key: `[privateKey]`. Save it securely — it will never be shown again. Send SOL to `[publicKey]` to start trading."
    quoted

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 12 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1022 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 114: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 11 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is not clearly malicious, but it needs review because it gives an agent fund-controlling Solana trading authority while handling wallet secrets and mutable remote instructions.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026