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画布工作区操作能力。当需要生成图片、编辑图片、将图片推送到画布、或处理用户画布标记时激活。 包含：(1) Qwen 图片生成/编辑案例脚本（文生图与编辑图分离，作为可复制的 MVP 模板）， (2) 画布操作 API（推送图片、查看状态、批量注入图片）， (3) 画布图片协议（用户标记/选中图片后的 JSON 文件解析）。 触发场景：用户要求生图、画图、修图、把图片放到画布上、或消息中包含画布图片文件 URL。 关键词匹配：当用户消息中出现以下关键词时应加载本 skill： 画布、canvas、生图、生成图片、画图、绘图、修图、编辑图片、图片编辑、 推送到画布、放到画布、添加到画布、inject、gen_image、标记、marker、 图生图、文生图、AI生图、设计图、海报、画布图片文件、canvas_images。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: quanming1 v1.4.4 MIT-0 9 files body ≈ 2 205 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
61/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
60
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/gemini_generate_image.py:17
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/qwen_edit_image.py:30
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/qwen_generate_image.py:15
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:91
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export QWEN_TEXT_IMAGE_API_KEY="用户提供的值"' >> ~/.bashrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:92
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export QWEN_TEXT_IMAGE_MODEL="qwen…pro"' >> ~/.bashrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:93
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export QWEN_BASE_URL="https://dashscope.aliyuncs.com/api/v1"' >> ~/.bashrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:95
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export QWEN_EDIT_IMAGE_API_KEY="用户提供的值"' >> ~/.bashrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:96
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export QWEN_EDIT_IMAGE_MODEL="qwen-image-edit"' >> ~/.bashrc

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 32 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2205 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -33 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 364: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 32 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 32 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This canvas image skill is mostly aligned with its purpose, but it needs review because it launches unpinned remote code, stores API keys persistently, fetches arbitrary URLs, and documents a destructive reset endpoint without guardrails.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026