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BB browser-automation

Vision-driven browser automation using Midscene. Operates from screenshots — no DOM or accessibility labels needed. Runs in headless Puppeteer — does NOT take over the user's mouse or keyboard. Also supports CDP mode and Bridge mode to connect to an existing Chrome. Use this skill when the user wants to: - Browse, navigate, or open web pages - Scrape, extract, or collect data from websites - Fill out forms, click buttons, or interact with web elements - Verify, validate, test, or QA frontend UI behavior - Take screenshots of web pages - Automate multi-step web workflows - Test what was just built, see if it works in browser - Connect to Chrome via CDP, DevTools Protocol, or remote debugging - Connect to user's Chrome browser, control my browser, operate my Chrome Powered by Midscene.js (https://midscenejs.com)

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Leyang v1.0.4 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 4 051 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, consistency, running it twice

ProcedurePlaywrightSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (browser-automation) differs from the folder (midscene-computer-browser)
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4051 tokens
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 39 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 8 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 824: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 27 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 39 items
    • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This appears to be a legitimate browser automation skill, but it needs Review because it can control a logged-in Chrome session and active tab without a clear confirmation step.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026