BB boost-x-engagement
Hourly X engagement loop for any X account. Two modes — interactive (per-item human approval) and scheduled (strict-rails auto-post under your custom safety filters). Drafts 1 original + 1-5 replies + 1-5 plain RTs per run. On first invocation, prompts you for your X handle, topic/niche, voice, RT allowlist, banned phrases, and daily caps. Save the config into your CLAUDE.md once to skip re-asking. Replies ALWAYS require manual approval — never auto-posted. Trigger phrases — boost X engagement, run my X loop, post on X, engage on X, shitpost on X.
As a process B 76/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:211Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)**Install Implexa** (`curl -fsSL https://core.implexa.ai/install.sh | bash`) to unlock:
quoted
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
Process rating: all ten parameters 76/100
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 74 steps
- 100Result and completion. Output format and completion criterion are stated
- 100Failures and branches. 9 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3231 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 553: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 23 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 74 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 57.