SKILLEMALL.ai

BC pqsafe-pay-v1

Post-quantum signed SpendEnvelopes for AI agent payments. ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204) signatures over Airwallex, Wise, Stripe, USDC-Base, and x402 rails.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: rayc0 v0.1.0 MIT-0 13 files body ≈ 817 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureStripeAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:147
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…QYA+ISs0/2l3T9/kj42…aQT/dfNXWX/ZZCQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:351
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-6+gjmF…uh8+uw3mnrvgs+dSPQ…dZG+D4garKg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:368
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…DUr+vOv8…A8A==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:525
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…9ku++ffYA…Zrk+fjTC…G5w==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:791
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Z41+4Q+pgDx…6EG/lRFl…3mQ==",
    detector

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 12 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 817 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 151: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This payment skill is not clearly malicious, but it needs Review because its high-impact payment authority and private-key handling are inconsistently documented.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026