DC red-team-verificator
(no description)
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.
Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.
How to improve
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
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medium Obfuscation
uni-mixed-script-wordSKILL.md:23Word mixing Latin and Cyrillic letters (homoglyph obfuscation) (3 occurrences)| 7 | Платёжная интеграция | ЮKassa = 2-4 недели, не ночь |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# RED TEAM ВЕРИФИКАТОР v2.0
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:9Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**Критически важно:** Проверяет не только стратега, но и Red Team-анализ — который тоже может врать, искажать и галлюцинировать.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:29Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| 13 | Фактчекинг Red Team | Red Team тоже может врать |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:99Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### НАЙДЕННЫЕ ИСКАЖЕНИЯ RED TEAM
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:134Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**ОПРОВЕРГНУТО С ОБРАТНЫМ ЗНАКОМ** — Red Team содержит искажения. Идея не убита, но требуется честный повторный анализ.
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 50 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2310 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 50 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +2Bilingual instructions (RU + EN)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.