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BC claw_store

Sovereign, recoverable memory for AI agents backed by Jackal decentralized storage.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Regan-Milne v1.3.7 MIT-0 9 files body ≈ 2 027 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
64
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: claw_store (ClawHub)

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:201
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - Your Jackal wallet private key never leaves your machine
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token jackal-memory/package-lock.json:44
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…ovq+VyC9…p8L/81Rk…DIw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token jackal-memory/package-lock.json:60
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…3SV+TCHq…BR5+ti7Hw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token jackal-memory/package-lock.json:108
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…2qx+pY3o…9dQ/jHwt…6oW+75WfIHZ+gNa+Ybg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token jackal-memory/package-lock.json:236
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-Gih++NYHEiP+oyD4…FSg+33Hp…p5Z+W3A==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token jackal-memory/package-lock.json:283
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-+Zk33…YqY+HvL4…jJA==",
    detector

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (claw_store) differs from the folder (claw-store)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 48 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 8 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2027 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 83: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 48 items
  • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
Claw Store appears to be a real encrypted memory tool, but it needs Review because it persists sensitive agent memory and performs risky first-run setup and secret display flows.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026