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BC ssh-executor

Execute commands on remote hosts over SSH with structured discovery, pluggable credential backends, and safety guardrails. Supports SSH key-based and password-based auth with multiple credential sources (vault, env vars, direct files). Includes 6-step discovery protocol and standardized JSON output. Host-key verification is strict by default. Cross-platform: works on Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Claude Code, Codex, and any LLM environment with bash + python3.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Rickk Barbosa v2.4.2 MIT-0 19 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 8 457 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, execution cost

AnalyzerDockerSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
59
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Execution cost w 6
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs-scoped references/vault-key-format.md:37
    Destructive command on a partition / current directory (normal in admin docs; verify the target) (documentation of a security skill)
    shred -u /dev/shm/key
    security skill

A further 3 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 19. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: Execute commands on remote hosts over SSH with structured discover… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 8457 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8457 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 85Steps. 39 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (36 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 458: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 46 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 39 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (10 of 11)
  • +3All 4 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 59.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This SSH skill is transparent about being powerful, but its sudo password handling can expose passwords and needs review before installation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 24 Jul 2026