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ClawHub Agent Skills author: ritsuKai2000 v1.0.0 5 files body ≈ 999 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash Read Edit Write Glob
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv references/setup.md:56
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:53
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "emoji"

Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 13 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 999 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 112: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly aligned with running a Jinn worker, but it asks for broad credentials, searches private files, installs mutable external code, and sets up persistent profiling jobs.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026