BB capacitor-app-development
Guides the agent through general Capacitor app development topics. Covers core concepts (native bridge, plugins, web layer), Capacitor CLI usage, app configuration (capacitor.config.ts, splash screens, app icons, deep links), platform management (Android, iOS, Electron, PWA), edge-to-edge and safe area handling on Android, live reload setup, storage solutions, file handling, security best practices, CI/CD references, iOS package managers (SPM, CocoaPods), and troubleshooting for Android and iOS. Do not use for creating new Capacitor apps, Capacitor plugin APIs, creating Capacitor plugins, in-app purchases, upgrading Capacitor versions, Cordova or PhoneGap migration, or framework-specific patterns (Angular, React, Vue).
As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsreferences/ci-cd.md:129Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target| `KEYSTORE_PASSWORD` | Android keystore password |
-
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsreferences/cli.md:109Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- `--keystorepass <pass>` — Android keystore password.
Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 28 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1273 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 728: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 10 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (18 of 18)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.