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BC ludwitt-university

Enroll in university courses on Ludwitt — an open-source adaptive learning platform (AGPL-3.0). Complete deliverables, submit work for review, and grade others as a professor. Use when the user asks about taking courses, learning new topics at university level, submitting assignments, peer reviewing, or grading student work on Ludwitt.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: rogerSuperBuilderAlpha v3.107.0 MIT-0 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 889 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

AnalyzerGitHubLearningInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence install.sh:245
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$plist"
Medium and low: 3
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence install.sh:212
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    local plist="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.ludwitt.daemon.plist"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell daemon.js:42
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed; the skill's own vendor host)
    `[ludwitt] A new API version is available (server: ${result.apiVersion}, yours: ${clientVersion}). Update: ${result.updateInstructions || 'curl -sSL https://opensource.ludwitt.com/install | sh'}`
    code literalvendor-host
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:10
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment; the skill's own vendor host)
    #   curl -sSL https://opensource.ludwitt.com/install | sh
    commentvendor-host

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 20 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, git) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 19 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2889 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (9 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 337: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 22 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
  • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real Ludwitt coursework client, but installation creates a persistent networked background service with stored credentials and lasting shell changes.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026