SKILLEMALL.ai

AD my-halala-sales-vp

Personal private test skill for halala sales-vp experiments. Use only when the owner explicitly asks for my-halala / halala sales workflow. Not a general-purpose public tool.

ClawHub Hermes author: CC v1.1.1 MIT-0 7 files · 1 script body ≈ 707 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

Personal private test skill for halala sales-vp experiments.

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. For Hermes the description must be one sentence under 60 characters; move the conditions to a "When to Use" section.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-requests-env-secret SKILL.md:1
    Skill asks the runtime to inject credential env vars into its sandbox: QIANLIMA_TOKEN — verify each one is needed for the stated purpose
    required_environment_variables: QIANLIMA_TOKEN

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-long-hermes description is 174 chars; the Hermes authoring standard requires ≤ 60 (one sentence, ending with a period)
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "required_environment_variables"

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Consistency. The Hermes dialect needs category and tags
  • 100Steps. 13 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 707 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 174: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This private sales workflow is not overtly malicious, but it needs review because it stores a third-party login token, downloads bid attachments, and can send collected content to an external model service with incomplete disclosure.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 7 Aug 2026