CC runapi-cli
Use the RunAPI CLI for one-off artifacts and results, or RunAPI's standard x402 REST flow for wallet-funded Task calls without an API key. Use when an agent needs to discover models or prices, create a paid Task, poll its result, or run a supported CLI service. Use an SDK for app or production integration.
Use the RunAPI CLI for one-off artifacts and results, or RunAPI's standard x402 REST flow for wallet-funded Task calls without an API key.
As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:408Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)curl -fsSL https://runapi.ai/cli/install.sh | sh
vendor-host -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:43Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation table row; the skill's own vendor host)| Server / CI (headless) | `curl -fsSL https://runapi.ai/cli/install.sh \| sh` |
tablevendor-host -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:147High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)`0x83…913`.
quoted
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "documentation" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "catalog"
Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 23 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4863 tokens
- 85Steps. 12 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 307: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 20 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
- +4Has examples (22 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.