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DC webhook-relay

Webhook Relay integration, driven by the `relay` CLI and the public bin API. Receive webhooks on a stable public HTTPS endpoint and forward them to a service on localhost or a private network with no public IP (the relay agent performs the last hop), or expose any local/internal HTTP or TCP service to the internet over a public tunnel. Capture and inspect incoming webhooks with a free, no-signup bin to debug exactly what a provider sends, verify HMAC signatures, and mock responses. Also: forward server-side to public URLs (no agent), fan out one webhook to many destinations, transform payloads with JavaScript functions, and schedule recurring (cron) webhooks. Use when the user wants to forward, tunnel, debug, transform, or schedule webhooks with Webhook Relay.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Karolis Rusenas v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 4 339 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 34 h ago

Webhook Relay integration, driven by the relay CLI and the public bin API.

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationSlackKubernetesSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
57/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
40
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:341
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    relay output create slack   -b alerts --type public -d https://hooks.slack.com/services/…
  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:342
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    relay output create discord -b alerts --type public -d https://discord.com/api/webhooks/…
  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:368
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    relay output create   -b to-slack --type public -d https://hooks.slack.com/services/… \
Medium and low: 2
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:419
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host)
    - Use a bin or https://webhook.site to inspect payloads while wiring up a real
    vendor-host
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:330
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    https://hooks.slack.com/services/T000/B000/XXXX
    placeholder

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4339 tokens
  • 85Steps. 42 steps, 2 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 770: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 20 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 42 items
  • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill is a coherent Webhook Relay guide, but users should treat its public tunneling and webhook capture workflows as sensitive network exposure.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 15 Jun 2026