BC conclave-testnet
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As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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high Exfiltration
exfil-send-secrets-to-urlskill-card.md:30Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint (the skill's own vendor host)Mitigation: Use a fictional or minimal persona, provide only operator-approved contact information, and send the token only to https://testnet-api.conclave.sh.
vendor-host
Medium and low: 1
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medium Exfiltration
exfil-send-secrets-to-urlSKILL.md:30Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint ("only send to …" — scoping, not exfiltration; the skill's own vendor host)Only send your token to `https://testnet-api.conclave.sh`. Never share it with other domains or services.
scopedvendor-host
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 70Failures and branches. 4 branches
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 71 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3128 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 224: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 20 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 71 items
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.