SKILLEMALL.ai

DC brain-search

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: ryandeangraves v1.1.0 3 files body ≈ 1 472 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
57/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal SKILL.md:20
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    All requests require header: `x-api-key: fran…026`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal SKILL.md:26
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    -H "x-api-key: fran…026"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal SKILL.md:32
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    -H "x-api-key: fran…026"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal SKILL.md:41
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    -H "x-api-key: fran…026" \
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal SKILL.md:55
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    -H "x-api-key: fran…026" \
    quoted

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
  • 100Steps. 13 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1472 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 25 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
  • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill openly connects an agent to a personal external knowledge base and gives it broad power to read, write, upload, delete, and delegate work there.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026