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DD telegram-media

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: ryandeangraves v1.0.0 2 files body ≈ 1 671 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceTelegramInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
57/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:30
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    r = requests.post(f'https://api.telegram.org/bot{TOKEN}/sendPhoto',
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:47
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    r = requests.post(f'https://api.telegram.org/bot{TOKEN}/sendDocument',
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:78
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    r = requests.post(f'https://api.telegram.org/bot{TOKEN}/sendPhoto',
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:96
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    r = requests.post(f'https://api.telegram.org/bot{TOKEN}/sendPhoto',
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:139
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    r = requests.post(f'https://api.telegram.org/bot{TOKEN}/sendVoice',
    vendor-hostquoted

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 17 mutating operations with no state check
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 12 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1671 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 17 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill matches its Telegram media purpose, but it can send local files or generated voice content through your credentials to a hardcoded Telegram chat unless carefully reconfigured.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026