SKILLEMALL.ai

AC chain-audit-deploy

Audit and deploy blockchain smart contracts (Solidity, Sui Move, Solana). Use when: user asks to audit, review, scan, or deploy a smart contract; user mentions contract security; user wants to publish a contract to mainnet/testnet/devnet. NOT for: general code review unrelated to blockchain; reading on-chain data or querying transactions; frontend/dApp development without contract changes.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: rzexin v1.0.0 MIT-0 23 files body ≈ 3 477 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

AnalyzerInfrastructureSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
95
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:199
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash && foundryup
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/report_template.md:76
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      > These issues should be fixed before deployment. They may lead to loss of funds or privilege escalation.
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell examples/solidity/README.md:26
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (test fixture / example file; documentation of a security skill)
      curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash && foundryup
      fixturesecurity skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/deploy_helper.py:144
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      "install_hint": "curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash && foundryup",
      detectorcode literal
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:66
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Access control and privilege escalation

    A further 3 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 23. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (chain-audit-deploy) differs from the folder (chain-audit-deploy-skill)
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Failures and branches. 4 branches
    • 100Steps. 74 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3477 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 392: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 20 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 74 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 4)
    • +3All 4 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 95.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is mostly a coherent blockchain audit/deploy helper, but it can handle real wallet credentials and on-chain deployments in ways that need careful review before use.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026