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AF wotohub-automation

End-to-end WotoHub influencer outreach automation for product understanding, creator search, recommendation ranking, outreach email drafting, batch send, inbox review, and guarded reply assist. Use when running TikTok Shop, Amazon, or Shopify creator campaigns and you want model-first planning with script-level execution.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: sa461151 v1.0.8 MIT-0 80 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 498 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 45/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: scripts/product_resolve.py

ProcedureShopifyMarketingSales and CRMtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
45/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: scripts/product_resolve.py
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • low Concealment en-hide-from-user scripts/campaign_engine.py:315
    Instruction to hide actions from the user (negated — the text forbids it)
    - review-required paths never silently send
    negated
  • low Concealment en-hide-from-user scripts/campaign_send_protocol.py:66
    Instruction to hide actions from the user (negated — the text forbids it)
    "notes": "Campaign engine prepares outreach candidates but does not silently send them.",
    negated

Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/product_resolve.py

Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: scripts/product_resolve.py
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: scripts/product_resolve.py
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 26 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Steps. 166 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3498 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -337 of 44 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 323: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 30 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 166 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (9 of 15)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real outreach automation skill, but it needs Review because it can send emails, read inbox data, create scheduled jobs, and run locally configured bridge commands with broad access.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026