DC openclaw-skill-gastown
(no description)
As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, execution cost
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcscripts/setup.sh:42Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export PATH=$PATH:$HOME/local/go/bin:$HOME/go/bin' >> "$HOME/.bashrc"
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:520Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo rm -rf /usr/local/go && sudo tar -C /usr/local -xzf go1.….gz
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcSKILL.md:521Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/go/bin:$HOME/go/bin' >> ~/.bashrc
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 16315 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 10Execution cost. Instruction body is 16315 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
- 30When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 22 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, git) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 167 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 22 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (29 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 166 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 167 items
- +4Has examples (88 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.