SKILLEMALL.ai

FB rent-a-person-ai

(no description)

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: saireetikap v1.0.35 21 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 13 885 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 79/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, execution cost

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
F
0/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
79/100
Nearly there
When it triggers w 12
30
Execution cost w 6
40
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
  3. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 24

  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url bridge/README.md:54
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    # https://abc1….io
  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/verify-setup.md:39
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    curl -X POST https://velia-regardable-reed.ngrok-free.dev \
  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/verify-setup.md:52
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    node test-webhook.js https://velia-regardable-reed.ngrok-free.dev
Medium and low: 21
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key bridge/server.js:35
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url INSTALLATION.md:152
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "webhookUrl": "https://abc1….io"
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url INSTALLATION.md:180
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "webhookUrl": "https://abc1….io/hooks/rentaperson"
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url rentaperson-agent.json:6
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "webhookUrl": "https://velia-regardable-reed.ngrok-free.dev",
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/fetch-test-ids.js:31
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/inject-api-key.js:37
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    const curlArgs = ['-H', `X-API-Key: ${key}`, ...args];
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/verify-setup.md:14
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Forwarding**: `https://velia-regardable-reed.ngrok-free.dev -> http://localhost:XXXX`
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process bridge/README.md:104
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable rentaperson-bridge
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url INSTALLATION.md:142
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (security demo / example; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    Copy the HTTPS URL (e.g., `https://abc1….io`)
    demoquoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process INSTALLATION.md:286
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable rentaperson-bridge
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/inject-api-key.js:12
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (code comment)
    *   → Runs curl with -H "X-API-Key: $RENTAPERSON_API_KEY" prepended.
    comment
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/setup.js:448
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (security demo / example; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    'Gateway base URL (e.g. https://abc1….io)',
    demoquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/setup.js:465
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (security demo / example; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const ngrokUrl = await ask(rl, 'Public webhook URL (e.g. https://abc1….io)', '');
    demoquoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/setup.js:845
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    Example: \`curl -H "X-API-Key: ${apiKey}" "${apiBase}/api/conversations"\`
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/test-webhook.js:5
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (code comment; test fixture / example file)
    * Example: node test-webhook.js https://abc1….io
    commentfixture
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/test-webhook.js:12
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.error('Example: node test-webhook.js https://abc1….io');
    fixturequoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/test-webhook.js:83
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.error('   https://velia-regardable-reed.ngrok-free.dev');
    fixturequoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/verify-setup.md:65
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    - Visit `https://velia-regardable-reed.ngrok-free.dev` in your browser first
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:45
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (security demo / example; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Webhook URL** (e.g. your ngrok HTTPS URL, e.g. `https://abc1….io`)
    demoquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:122
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (security demo / example; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    Copy the **HTTPS** URL (e.g. `https://abc1….io`), then register:
    demoquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url WEBHOOK_API_KEY_SOLUTION.md:341
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    4. Point RentAPerson webhook at: `https://your-ngrok.ngrok.io` (bridge port)
    placeholder

Files scanned: 21. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 13885 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 79/100

  • 30When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 13885 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 85Steps. 127 steps, 3 vague phrases
  • 100Result and completion. Output format and completion criterion are stated
  • 100Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Failures and branches. 25 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -36 of 10 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 41 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 127 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (49 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real RentAPerson automation skill, but it weakens webhook trust boundaries and exposes API keys in agent-visible messages and bundled config.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026